Unlike Poipu Condominiums that experienced a 35% spike from 2004 to 2006, Princeville's Mean Sales Price increase has been more gradual. Consequently, the back-pedaling of equity values in the Princeville condominium market, therefore, shows statistically a much less less-dramatic contraction. This phenomenon may also be attributed to the consistently higher number of condominiums on the market in Princeville over Poipu that moderates such market fluctuations.
Federal bailouts, equity buys into banks and investment houses, liquidity infusions by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, loan guarantees and economic stimulus checks now total $8.5 trillion, according to various estimates.
That equates to about 60 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, which will come in around $14 trillion, according to economists.
The $8.5 trillion total in bailouts is nearly twice the size of annual GDP in Japan and accounts for more than the annual GDP of every national economy except the U.S., European Union and China, according to federal data.
The $8.5 trillion includes the $700 billion bank and Wall Street bailout; federal takeovers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; individualized bailouts for Citigroup and American International Group; and various cash infusions into financial and lending markets by the Fed. The $700 billion includes federal equity buys into Bank of America Corp., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and other financial institutions.
The National Association of Realtors projects that as the US economy continues to back-pedal, Real Estate prices nationally will soon contract to 2004 levels. Based on current figures as shown on the graph below, Poipu Beach condo prices have already returned to those levels. This suggests that Poipu Condominium prices may contract even further (2003 levels) since they are essentially second home investment properties.
Seeing the threat to the world economy’s vital functions, the policymakers have been working overtime. Interest rates have been cut dramatically. American rates are already down to 1%; Britain’s are at a 50-year low; and this week China’s central bank lopped 108 basis points off its main policy rate. Hundreds of billions have been pumped into banks and financial markets. Many financial institutions have been bailed out: the rescue of the once mighty Citigroup is merely the latest unthinkable to happen. Despite all this, the patient has not responded. This is partly because some traditional remedies, such as looser monetary policy, are weakened in a credit crunch. It is also because the doctors have been ham-fisted: look at Hank Paulson’s changes of mind about whether to use America’s $700 billion rescue fund to recapitalise banks or to buy toxic assets. In addition, though, a lot of policy has been far too timid. Halting the world economy’s decline will demand something rather bolder than anything seen so far in this crisis.
The current scarcity of funds available for mortgage lending creates a chicken-and-egg situation,
1. Investors who provide funding for home loans don't want to commit more money until they believe the housing market is getting better.
2. But it's hard for the housing market to rebound as long as mortgage credit is tight.
3. Lower prices eventually will break this impasse, by luring buyers back into the market and reassuring investors that the market is finding a bottom.
Wall Street analysts, congressional overseers and the media have parsed every detail of the Treasury Department's financial rescue program -- $250 billion and counting.
Largely outside public view, however, the Federal Reserve is lending far more than that amount -- $893 billion, roughly the equivalent of the annual economic output of Mexico -- to help a wide range of institutions weather the economic storm.
As of last week, the Fed's loans included $507 billion to banks, $50 billion to investment firms, $70 billion for money market mutual funds, and $266 billion to companies that use a form of short-term debt called commercial paper. It is considering a new program that would make billions more available to prop up consumer lending: auto loans, credit cards and the like.
In lending these vast sums, the Fed is essentially substituting its own unlimited ability to supply cash for that of private markets, which are not functioning normally. The central bank is even fulfilling some of the original goals of the Treasury Department's $700 billion rescue program by allowing financial institutions to use securities that are difficult to sell as collateral for loans.
"The existing system of lending is broken," said David Shulman, a senior economist at the UCLA Anderson Forecast, which analyzes economic trends. "The Fed is coming in to do that lending. That's why they call it the lender of last resort."
But unlike the Treasury's rescue package, which has elaborate disclosure requirements and oversight mechanisms, the Fed lending is occurring quietly and at the discretion of its five governors, as well as top officials of the 12 regional Fed banks. Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Obama administration's expected nominee for Treasury secretary, has been a leading architect of the new lending programs.
Following a long-standing practice designed to protect investor and depositor confidence in the institutions it deals with, the Fed refuses to name the banks and other companies accessing the cash. It has also declined to specify which assets institutions have pledged as collateral in exchange for loans, a decision that has drawn skeptical questioning from Capitol Hill and at least one lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. Fed officials argue that any disclosure along those lines would create a stigma for banks and others that need to borrow from the Fed, making the programs less effective at jump-starting lending.
"There's a concern that if the name is put in the newspaper that such and such bank came to the Fed to borrow overnight for a good reason, that people might begin to worry: Is this bank credit-worthy?" Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told Congress last week. "And that might create a stigma, a problem, and might cause banks to be unwilling to borrow."
Bernanke also said there is little chance taxpayers will lose money on most of that lending, because the central bank lends money only to institutions it views as sound
Assuming he is nominated Mr Geithner brings two crucial qualities. First, he represents continuity. From the first days of the crisis last year, he has worked hand in glove with Ben Bernanke, the Fed chairman, and Mr Paulson. He can continue to do so while awaiting confirmation. If Citigroup, for example, needs federal help, Mr Geithner will be involved. An unknown when he joined the New York Fed in 2003, he is now a familiar face to the most senior executives on Wall Street and to central bankers and finance ministers overseas.
Second, he represents competence. He has spent more time on financial crises, from Mexico and Thailand to Brazil and Argentina, than probably any other policymaker in office today. Mr Geithner understands better than almost anyone that in crises you throw out the forecast and focus on avoiding low probability events with catastrophic consequences. Such judgments are excruciating: do too little, and you undermine confidence and generate a bigger crisis that needs even bigger policy action. Do too much, and you look panicked and invite blowback from Wall Street, Congress and the press. At times during the crisis Mr Geithner would counsel Mr Bernanke on the importance of the right "ratio of drama to effectiveness".
In normal times, risk aversion damps economic cycles; in a crisis, it accentuates them, leading to withdrawn credit, evaporating liquidity, margin calls, falling asset prices, and more risk aversion. "The brake becomes the accelerator," as he puts it. Indeed, although he worked alongside Mr Paulson on the crisis, he has at times advocated a more aggressive approach. For example, news reports say that he was not comfortable with Mr Paulson's decision to take public money off the table in the ultimately unsuccessful effort to save Lehman Brothers. He has not always got it right: he was the most important architect of the original bail-out of American International Group, an insurer, which in time has proved flawed, requiring significant amendment.
Disclaimer: ActiveRain Corp. does not necessarily endorse the real estate agents, loan officers and brokers listed on this site. These real estate profiles, blogs and blog entries are provided here as a courtesy to our visitors to help them make an informed decision when buying or selling a house. ActiveRain Corp. takes no responsibility for the content in these profiles, that are written by the members of this community.
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