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FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING LAW
The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is a cornerstone of consumer credit legislation. The Statute is Congress's effort to guarantee the the accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and thereby to enable consumers to make informed choices in the marketplace. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The Act is designed to protect borrowers who are not on an equal footing with creditors either in bargaining power or with respect to the knowledge of credit terms. In other words, TILA was passed to aid the unsophisticated consumer. See Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc. 619 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1980). The Act is also remedial and must be liberally construed in favor of borrowers. See King v. California, 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986). Except where Congress has relieved lenders of liability for noncompliance, it is a strict liability statute. Courts should continue to assure that consumers are accorded the full remedies available under the Act for violations found, even if they might seem technical. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1145, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994). Although Congress permitted the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations implementing TILA (Reg Z), and to issue interpretations and official staff commentary that the Courts consider to be persuasive authority, the FRB's authority is not without limits, and a regulation that conflicts with TILA cannot stand. See Fabricant v. Sears, Roebuck, Clearinghouse No. 54,563 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2002).
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CANCEL - DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
A common violation we find (and you can check your loan documents to see if you have such a violation) is that in a refinance transaction each borrower or person with ownership interest in the property did not receive two copies each of the federally required notice of right to cancel. If this is true, and your loan was originated within the statutory three year period (note that arguments for equitable tolling may exist) then this violation, although appearing technical in nature, can trigger an extended three year right to cancel your loan.
Under Federal Truth in Lending Law, each Borrower, or person with ownership interest in the property, (in a non-purchase loan or other exempt transaction) in which a security interest, including any such interest arising by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any property which is used as the principal dwelling, shall be provided with TWO (2) COMPLETED copies EACH of a notice of right to rescind (cancel). It is the lender’s obligation to complete these forms and deliver TWO copies to each Borrower or person with Ownership interest in the Property. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), Reg. Z §§ 226.5(b), 226.23(b). If each borrower or person with ownership interest is not provided two adequate copies of this Notice, an extended three year right to rescind is permitted under the Federal Truth in Lending Law.
The notice shall identify the transaction or occurrence and clearly and conspicuously disclose the following:
- The retention or acquisition of a security interest in the consumer's principal dwelling.
- The consumer's right to rescind, as described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
- How to exercise the right to rescind, with a form for that purpose, designating the address of the creditor's place of business.
- The effects of rescission, as described in paragraph (d) of this section.
- The date the rescission period expires. (See Reg. Z §§ 226.15(b)(5) and 226.23(b)(5))
See Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). If the notice is subject to more than one sensible reading, and different results ensue depending upon which of the readings is adopted, the creditor has not met the “clear and conspicuous standard.” SeeHandy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.32 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2006).
TWO KEY POINTS WE WILL ARGUE (when the two copies each are received but the rescission dates are not filled in – a common TILA violation)
(1) The Lender must fill in the form and dates (not the borrower) – If the creditor uses the proper model form, properly completed…......and fulfills all other requirements, the borrower has no rescission right. This position is supported by the actual text of the law - See 15 U.S.C. §1635(h) - which states:
Limitation on rescission:
“An obligor shall have no rescission rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board, or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was properly completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of this section regarding notice.”
The plain-meaning implication of this statutory provision SEEMS TO BE clear (and therefore is controlling), the lender has the obligation to complete these forms, it is not the borrowers duty to determine what dates to insert into the forms, much less at the direction of a mobile notary. In fact, the escrow instructions and lender's instruction sheet for the notice of right to cancel form usually set forth the requirement that the dates be inserted before the borrower is asked to sign all copies. We will present credible testimony on this point as well. For now, please see attached Exhibit “A” which sets forth the evidence currently in our possession, of which we will rely on, and will build our discovery foundation upon.
This reading of the law (that it is the lender's obligation to insert the dates, and not the borrowers) is also consistent with the requirement #5 (set forth above) that “the lender shall clearly and conspicuously identify the date the rescission period expires.” In fact, at least two courts have held in the First and Second circuit: “the complexity of business transactions under TILA means that the average consumer cannot figure out when TILA rights expire.....” See Bonney v. Wash. Mutual Bank, No. 08-30087 (D. Mass. July 30, 2008). Placing this burden on the borrower strips the “truth” from the transaction.
Finally, adding yet more support that the lender, not the borrower, must fill in the dates of the TILA right to rescind notice is a holding from another court which held: “Under both TILA and Regulation Z, the test for disclosure of the rescission right is whether the form of notice that the lender provided constitutes a clear notice of that right. See Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 961 F.2d 1066, 1076 (3d Cir.1992) (“the law does not require an ideal notice of rescission rights, just a clear, accurate and conspicuous one.”).........the right to rescind can be clearly disclosed only ifthose two dates are filled in.” See Meyer v. Argent Mortgage Co., (In re Meyer), 379 B.R. 529 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
(2) The Lender is required to provide TWO copies of the notice of right to cancel to EACH borrower along with a copy of all of the material TILA disclosures. Failure to meet these requirements also provides an extended three year right to rescind the loan transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a); Reg. Z §§ 226.15(b), 226.23(b) and Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster), 300 B.R. 787 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003).
HERE IS ANOTHER WAY TO GET THE EXTENDED THREE YEAR RESCISSION RIGHT (USUALLY A LOAN AUDIT IS REQUIRED) The material disclosures required in a closed-end transaction, (APR, including the existence of a variable rate feature, Finance Charge, Amount Financed, Total of Payments, and Payment schedule) the failure of which to disclose results in an extended three year right to rescind. See Gaono v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1053, (8th Cir. 2003).
Where only one copy of the notice of right to cancel is received, or where each borrower does not receive two signed and completed copies of the required right to cancel an extended three year right to rescind will apply.
Note: the lender will argue “the borrower signed an acknowledgement that they received two copies each, and therefore there is no TILA violation, sorry case closed.” It seems these lenders and loan servicers forget to read the following section of the law which we will frequently have to raise.
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS UNDER TILA
Even assuming for the sake of argument that there are two signed, dated, and accurately completed notice of right to cancel documents in the lender's possession (or the consumer's acknowledgment of receipt of two completed copies), this merely raises a rebuttable presumption that the lender delivered two copies to the borrower. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c), and Johnson v, New Century Mortgage Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2D 606, 611 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Courts permit competent testimony to rebut this assertion of the lender.
The critical factor is not whether the creditor has two signed and completed copies of the notice, but whether the borrower has possession of two signed, dated, and completed copies of the notice of right to cancel. Whether borrowers were delivered a blank notice of right to cancel is a question of fact that will not be decided on a motion to dismiss. See Clay v. Johnson, 77 F.Supp. 2D 879 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The debtor's denial of receipt of the notices and disclosures creates a question of fact that will not be decided on summary judgment even where the borrower signed acknowledgement of having received two copies of the notice. See Moore v. Mortgagestar, Inc. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27457, (W.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2002). Once the borrower rebuts the presumption of delivery (through competent testimony, affidavits, etc.) the burden shifts to the creditor to prove the delivery of the documents. See Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc., 309 B.R. 139, 157 (Bankr. E.D. Pa 204).
In addition, where the debtors testify that they did not receive the disclosures (even if not “totally convincing”), the debtor's should prevail if the credit cannot produce from its own records any copy of the disclosures. See In re Pinder, 83 B.R. 905, 913.
In most cases, especially where the borrower has credibility and kept track of all their loan documents (and where a mobile notary was used to sign the loan docs) the borrower can normally make a fair argument to rebut any assertion that the lender complied with the clear and conspicuous notice requirements and can counter any such assertion with competent testimonial evidence.
THE FOLLOWING IS SOME GENERAL INFORMATION ON EXERCISING RESCISSION RIGHTS:
THREE YEAR EXTENDED RIGHT TO RESCIND
(a) Consumer's right to rescind. (1) “In a credit transaction in which a security interest is or will be retained or acquired in a consumer's principal dwelling, each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest shall have the right to rescind the transaction….”
(b) Exercising the right of Rescission:
- 226.23(3) – “The consumer may exercise the right to rescind until midnight of the third business day following consummation, delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this section, or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever occurs last.If the required notice or material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of all of the consumer's interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first. In the case of certain administrative proceedings, the rescission period shall be extended in accordance with section 125(f) of the Act.” There is also legal precedence for “tolling” the statute beyond three years where fraudulent concealment is shown. See Bank of New York v. Waldon, 751 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
- 226.23(2): (2) “To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written communication. Notice is considered given when mailed, when filed for telegraphic transmission or, if sent by other means, when delivered to the creditor's designated place of business.” There is also legal precedence for the proposition that filing a lawsuit demanding to exercise rescission rights is also sufficient notice. See Garedakis v. Indymac Bank, 2004 WL 2254676 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2004) and Jones v. Saxon Mortgage, Inc. 161 F.2d 2 (table), 1988 WL 614150 (4th Cir. Sept. 9, 1998).
EFFECTS OF RESCISSION UNDER TILA (IN GENERAL):
I. STEP ONE:
When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.
THIS MEANS THE SECURITY INTEREST BECOMES VOID BY OPERATION OF LAW.
Following the 2003 Yamamoto decision (discussed below) the FRB added language to the commentary, (Section 226.23 of Regulation Z implements § 1635(b)). Which stated:
- When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.
- Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction and shall take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.
- If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain possession until the creditor has met its obligation under paragraph (d)(2) of this section. When the creditor has complied with that paragraph, the consumer shall tender the money or property to the creditor....
- The procedures outlined in paragraphs (d)(2) and (3) of this section may be modified by court order.
Note: This suggests section (1) above is NOT altered, and so when a consumer rescinds, "the security interest becomes void." Unless the Court alters the procedure, the Courts have the discretion.
Where the TILA statute is clear it must be followed. Courts only have the power to alter whether the lender has to tender first, or the borrower has to tender first. See Yamamoto v. Bank of New York, 329 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003), but see Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings & Loan Association, 791 F.2d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir.1986) (which stands for the proposition that the Court can alter the “procedure” of TILA but not the “substance” of TILA). The substance of TILA, as described above, is that the security interest becomes void upon the exercise of rescission, (although the Court can alter this procedure by requiring the borrower to tender first).
In Yamamoto, the Court held:
“There is no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures after deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so before deciding that rescission is warranted when it finds that, assuming grounds for rescission exist, rescission still could not be enforced because the borrower cannot comply with the borrower's rescission obligations no matter what. Such a decision lies within the court's equitable discretion, taking into consideration all the circumstances including the nature of the violations and the borrower's ability to repay the proceeds. If ... it is clear from the evidence that the borrower lacks capacity to pay back what she has received (less interest, finance charges, etc.), the court does not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do after. Determinations regarding rescission procedures shall be made on a “case-by-case basis, in light of the record adduced.”
This case illustrates that the Courts hold the ultimate power to exercise their discretion in any TILA rescission case, and does not NECESSARILY require that the borrower prove its ability to tender as a pre-condition to exercising rescission rights.
In fact, a California Court, in Pelayo v. Home Capital Funding, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 1459419, S.D.Cal.,2009, recently denied a lenders motion to dismiss a TILA rescission claim where the Defendant argued that the borrower was required to tender before rescission could be allowed (the Defendant essentially arguing that the security instrument was not automatically void), and where the Defendant argued the Court could not hear the case until the lender made its decision within 20 days (essentially arguing the TILA claim was not ripe for review). The Court held that the case could be heard and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. This ruling suggests that although the Court is permitted to modify the rescission procedure and require proof of tender by the Borrower first, it was also free NOT to modify the procedure and essentially treat the security instrument as being void (as the TILA statute requires), thus making the rescission case ripe for review.
There is also legal precedent which suggests that a Court could exercise its “equitable discretion” under TILA and allow the borrower to make payments over time as part of meeting the borrower’s tender requirement (essentially reducing the monthly payment over time). See. In re Stuart, 367 B.R. 541, 552 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007); Shepeard v. Quality Sliding & Window Factory, Inc., 730 F.Supp. 1295 (D.Del.1990) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payments); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 710 F.Supp. 143, 149 (E.D.Pa.1989) (allowing borrower to satisfy tender obligation by making monthly payment).
Also note, SOMETIMES (THIS IS PULLED OFF ONE LOAN) the Notice of Right to Cancel Form given to the borrower states:
“If you cancel the transaction, the mortgage/lien/security interest is also canceled. Within 20 CALENDAR DAYS after we receive your notice, we must take the steps necessary to reflect the fact that the mortgage/lien/security interest on your home has been cancelled, and we must return to you any money or property you have given us or to anyone else in connection with this transaction.
You may keep any money or property we have given you until we have done the things mentioned above, but you must then offer to return the money or property. If it is impractical or unfair for you to return the property, you must offer its reasonable value. You may offer to return the property at your home or at the location of the property. Money must be returned to the address below. If we do not take possession of the money or property within 20 CALENDAR DAYS of your offer, you may keep it without further obligation.”
This SEEMS TO BE a legal assertion, in the form of an admission, that the security interest is automatically void upon the consumer’s exercise of rescission. Upon the consumers act of “cancelling the transaction” the “mortgage/lien/security interest is also cancelled.” A creditor should not be permitted to renege on this assertion (estoppels applies) and the lender is bound by law to honor it.
II. STEP TWO
Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return any money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction and shall take any action necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.
Note: THE LENDER /SERVICER WILL NOT WANT TO DO THIS SO DON’T COUNT IT. In most cases, they would rather face a judge and see if you can prove your ability to tender.
III. STEP THREE
If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain possession until the creditor has met its obligation under paragraph (d)(2) of this section. When the creditor has complied with that paragraph, the consumer shall tender the money or property to the creditor or, where the latter would be impracticable or inequitable, tender its reasonable value. At the consumer's option, tender of property may be made at the location of the property or at the consumer's residence. Tender of money must be made at the creditor's designated place of business. If the creditor does not take possession of the money or property within 20 calendar days after the consumer's tender, the consumer may keep it without further obligation.
Again, the Court may alter only steps two and step three per the Federal Reserve Board’s commentary set forth above. Such FRB opinion should be seen as persuasive legal authority.
THE OTHER NICE THING ABOUT A TRUTH IN LENDING RESCISSION CLAIM IS THAT IT IS APPLICABLE AGAINST ANY AND ALL LOAN ASSIGNEES WITHOUT FEAR OF A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE ARGUMENT.
ASSIGNEE LIABILTY FOR RESCSSION
While assignees are only liable for TILA “statutory damages” that are “apparent on the face of the loan documents” assignees are subject to the rescission right to the same extent as the original creditor.
15 U.S.C. §1641(c) states:
Right of rescission by consumer unaffected
Any consumer who has the right to rescind a transaction under section 1635 of this title may rescind the transaction as against any assignee of the obligation.
See also the case of Ocwen Fed. Bank v. Russell, 53 P.3d 312 (Haw Ct. App. 2002) which rejected the assignees holder in due course argument as being no defense to rescission. As other courts have held: “without such protection for the consumer the right of rescission would provide little or no effective remedy.” See Stone v. Mehlberg, 728 F. Supp. 1341, 1348, (W.D. Mich 1989). A loan servicer is deemed an assignee if it “is or was the holder of the obligation.” See 15 U.S.C. §1641(f)(1). Please see our request to identify the holder of the loan obligation or master loan servicer below.
As a final note, in regard to reviewing whether any additional damages may be levied against an assignee of a loan, in the Meyer case cited above the Court held:
“TILA Section 1641 addresses the circumstances under which an assignee may be liable for violations committed by the prior holder. For loans-such as this one-which are secured by real estate, the statute provides as follows:
Liability of assignee for consumer credit transactions secured by real property
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subchapter, any civil action against a creditor for a violation of this subchapter, and any proceeding under section 1607 of this title against a creditor, with respect to a consumer credit transaction secured by real property may be maintained against any assignee of such creditor only if -
(A) the violation for which such action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement provided in connection with such transaction pursuant to this subchapter; and the assignment to the assignee was voluntary.
For the purpose of this section, a violation is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement if the disclosure can be determined to be incomplete or inaccurate by a comparison among the disclosure statement, any itemization of the amount financed, the note, or any other disclosure of disbursement....”
We hereby reserve our rights and will seek to hold any assignees liable for any other violations uncovered following discovery.
Also note there is case law that dictates an injunction against foreclosure is also permitted even in the absence of a tender ability at the outset of the litigation. “Rescission premised upon tender is not mandatory but an option within the equitable powers of the court.” Avila v. Stearns Lending, 2008 WL 1378231 (C.D. Cal April 7, 2008).
Also note, the Courts have recognized the right to seek an injunction against foreclosure where this right (rescission) is ignored by the lender or assignee. See Horton v. California Credit Corp., 2009 WL 700223 (S.D.Cal.) 2009. Note, that the 9th Circuit Court did not require an initial “tender” obligation from the borrower in granting the injunction where missing dates on the TILA notice of right to cancel were found.
If you have a refinance loan within the last three years (meaning it has not been more than three years since your last refinance, you may want to look at your previous loan file and determine whether or not you have a right to rescind the loan. In some cases, you will need to perform a mortgage loan audit to detect under-disclosure of APR and finance charges and other material disclosure violations. In other cases, look at your notice of right to cancel documents and see if you got two completed copies of the notice of right to cancel document (for each borrower or person with ownership interest in the property) and see if the rescission dates are filled in and otherwise accurate. If not, you may have an extended three year right to rescind your loan, and if so, you need to send in a rescission letter to protect your rights. If the lender refuses to acknowledge your legal rights under Truth in Lending Law (TILA) you may have grounds to file for an injunction to halt any slated foreclosures. In many cases, you will need to show some ability to tender back to the lender, the amounts which you would owe them (your loan balance) minus the amounts they owe you pursuant to their TILA tender obligation.
This area of the law can be tricky, so you may want to meet with an Attorney to discuss your case. In California, no attorney or other persona may accept advance fees for loan modifications pursuant to SB 94.