In today's Inman Article, Fannie and Freddie reported both credit, and mark-to-market losses that hovered around 3.5 billion*. The point of the article was that at a time when these GSE's are the only real players providing liquidity to our primary mortgage markets, financial troubles may limit their role in the clean-up moving forward. The article ends on a high note stating losses were mitigate by gains elsewhere. Nevertheless, present performance paints no clear picture to future outcomes especially when consensus as to the severity of our credit problem remains uncertain.
For those not familiar with Fannie and Freddie, let's break down who they are, what role they play, and how they contribute to real estate values as we know it.
Part and parcel to our credit system is the salability of debt to investors. When you take a loan on a house, that loan is either retained in a banks' portfolio to be serviced, or sold off to secondary markets (i.e. Fannie and Freddie) that securitize your loan with thousands of others that are repackaged and publicly traded. A process called "securitization". Securitization effectively replenishes the available credit that primary banks such as Countrywide or Washington Mutual have available to offer the public. Without Fannie or Freddie, these banks would have to service any loans they fund which would spike the cost of credit by a sharp supply/demand credit imbalance. 
Fannie and Freddie are for profit corporations and not government entities. They are labeled "GSE's" (Government Sponsored Enterprises) since they are federally chartered organizations overseen by government regulatory agencies. This does not mean that the government backs the guarantees that Fannie and Freddie issue. It only means that as privately owned corporations, they are authorized to maintain trillion-dollar (combined) portfolios under government supervision (OFHEO) to advance homeownership.
The issue at hand is that our credit system has everything to do with real estate wealth accumulation as we know it. Without a sound credit system for us to leverage and trade property, we're left with what utterly resembles a cash economy. The question you have to ask yourself at this moment is, "What would your home be worth if the next time you sold, the buyer had to pay cash?" This question - let alone the answer - should be alarming. More so since Freddie Mac stocks dropped 29% today alone and Fannie and Freddie combined have lost 41 billion in market value this year already.
Recently, legislators have been toying with increasing the GSE's ability to take on more debt at loan limits far above their current cap of $417,000. A stratum previously propped-up by Wall Street which in August suffered a "Minsky" moment and abandoned this stratum. This abandonment left primary mortgage markets to bear the grunt of credit issuance and servicing for non-conforming and jumbo loans. The net effect to homeowners is higher cost of credit (interest rates) and stricter guidelines to obtain it. Ultimately - its property values that adjust to balance out the affordability factor.
Evidence of this is wide spread. The race to liquidity has most Southern California cities where sales prices peaked between $500,000 and $750,000 racing to conforming loan limits ($417,000). The reason is that the buyers in these price spheres are illiquid. They lack the sufficient assets in cash or other to meet the new requirements to obtain financing. Hence, most market's previously built on a foundation of high LTV non-conforming and jumbo loans are crumbling. And the homeowners with outstanding loans are now equity-insolvent and negatively positioned in their mortgages.
The fundamental flaw in our present credit architecture lays in its inability to self-correct without disaster. Perpetual growth is sustained by "Ponzi like" behavior but once the bottom feeders are unable to play the pyramid implodes. At least for the moment, Fannie and Freddie continue to sport additional innings but the near future is uncertain.
By many accounts, it's been estimated that approximately 2.2 million households will end up in foreclosure by roughly 2009. If estimated at 3 persons per household, that's approximately 6,600,000 people displaced from ownership and driven to tenancy. The effect of this in all likelihood will be catastrophic.
In most neighborhoods, it takes only one or two distress properties that eventually result in foreclosure to stress the market. It's the few that symptom underlying economic weakness that perpetuate a psychological strain on the participants. With this understanding, it's easy to see how 2.2 million foreclosures can multiply exponentially given time.
Buddy Piszel - Freddie Mac CFO - said recently that they have already begun tightening up guidelines, bolstered risk management practices and are raising the cost of credit to offset losses. As Freddie hovers just over their mandatory capital surplus to remain in business, the odds of them picking up where Wall Street left off seems remote. This indeed is counter productive to resolving the credit crisis at higher echelons. But in no way shelters them from eminent disaster.
As upper price segments continue to implode over lower price points, Fannie and Freddie's portfolio lays target to defaults. While there is liquidity in price segments up to $417,000, the decline in prices of more desirable markets cause a trickle down price effect crushing equity below it.
Hence - Fannie, Freddie and our Legislators are truly at crossroads and faced with a tactical decision with no guarantee of success.
Do they fuel liquidity in the upper price markets by purchasing non-conforming and jumbo loans to preserve their existing portfolios? Or do they bow out and allow the trickle effect to take place? By gambling the former, a "Hail Mary" play of monumental proportions, they could in fact cancel an inevitable nationwide (maybe even worldwide) recession. If they don't, they will seemingly prolong the inevitable decay in property values that will strangle the economy as would be borrowers fall below lendable status for years to follow.
*** RELATED ARTICLES AND UPDATES ***
Update: 03/21/2008 - Article Date: 03/21/2008 - Housing Wire - Fannie, Freddie Face "Severe" Capital Pressures, Say Analysts (See Comment Thread)
Update: 03/10/2008 - Article Date: 03/10/2008 - Bloomberg - Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Plunge on Concern Over Losses
Update: 03/07/2008 - Article Date: 03/07/2008 - What if Fannie and Freddie Can't Prop Up Housing? (See Comment Thread)
Update: 02/08/2008 - Article Date: 02/08/2008 - Congress OKs stimulus bill, loan limit increase (See Comment Thread)
Update: 12/04/2007 - Article Date: 12/04/2007 - Bloomberg: Fannie cuts dividend, offers $7B in preferred
Update: 11/28/2007 - Article Date: 11/28/2007 - Banks see delinquent loans rise 23.8%
Update: 11/28/2007 - Article Date: 11/27/2007 - Freddie Cuts Dividend, Announces $6 Billion Preferred Offering
Update: 11/25/2007 - Article Date: 11/23/2007 - Mortgage meltdown's nightmare scenario
Update: 11/28/2007 - Article Date: 11/20/2007 - Freddie Feels Mortgage Crisis; $4.8 Billion in Write-offs, Loan Loss Reserves
*** Previous Third Party Reports ***
Source: CMG Mortgage
Freddie Posts $2 Billion Loss; Will Raise Capital
Stung by declining home values and subprime delinquencies, Congressionally chartered mortgage giant Freddie Mac posted a $2 billion loss in the third quarter, noting that it may raise additional capital in "the very near term" so it can meet a 30% minimum capital standard. Early Tuesday morning it was unclear how much of its 3Q loss is directly tied to markdowns on the value of its $120 billion subprime portfolio. It experienced GAAP mark-to-market losses of $3.6 billion in the quarter, which includes $2.3 billion in credit items and $1.5 billion in interest-rate items. "Weakening house prices and deteriorating credit have hurt Freddie Mac's results, as well as those of other participants in the mortgage market," said Buddy Piszel, chief financial officer. "You can see the impact of these trends in our credit results and throughout our financial statements. Year-to-date, we have recognized $4.6 billion in net credit-related items on a pre-tax basis."
Freddie Predicts 'Credit Costs' of $16 Billion
Freddie Mac officials, noting that they are being "conservative" in their loss estimates, on Tuesday forecasted $16.4 billion in future "credit costs" to cover writedowns but believe the actual loss experience will be $10 billion to $12 billion. Discussing its poor third quarter performance, company officials predicted dismal fourth quarter results as well. It also was hinted that Freddie tried to obtain a regulatory waiver on maintaining a 30% excess capital ratio but was rejected by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. All the bad news was not what stock analysts wanted to hear. During the conference call, company CEO and chairman Richard Syron suggested that a preferred stock offering to bolster its capital position was imminent.
NOTE: Freddie losses are being reported anywhere from 2 billion to 4.8 billion depending on the source (bloomberg, hotwire, etc...).