* * * WARNING, HARD CORE REAL ESTATE TALK * * *
INSPIRED by Gena Riede's post today about Mortgage Relief for Subprime Borrowers in California, my head is swimming with questions and potential problems. I would much prefer that an experienced mortgage professional write this, but since it's my head swimming, below are some thoughts. That's all they are, thoughts, because the ramifications of this "program" may be far reaching or it may be severely limited. It appears that a significant percentage of loans from some loan servicing companies are sub-pri
me loans. The servicing companies Governor Schwarzenegger (love that guy) met with are:
- Countrywide Financial Corp.
- GMAC Mortgage
- Litton Loan Servicing
- Home Eq Servicing
Gena's article states: The Governor asked these loan servicers to voluntarily agree to NOT adjust mortgage rates on their subprime loans which constitute 25% of their real estate loans.
That number absolutely surprises and shocks me to my bones. Not because of who the loan servicing companies are. The question is "Who originated that many sub-prime loans for home buyers in California in the critical period". I'm assuming the critical period would be 2004, 2005 and 2006 since most sub-prime loans are going to reset in 2-3 years following origination. These loans would have been originated at the peak of price escalation for the recent "boom". So, I'm assuming that any losses resulting from these loans not adjusting will be absorbed by the lenders that originated the loans. We know who the loan servicers are, but do we know if the loans have been sold? If the loans have been sold to Fannie or Freddie, the loan servicers may take the hit. I'm not clear of the loan originator's involvement in a defaulting conventional loan. We need input from some loan experts here. Also, the number of loans adjusting is not sufficient reason for a bail-out. The circumstances under which the borrowers obtained the loans now defaulting has to be investigated and if mortgage fraud was involved, the originators should be held accountable. If accountability isn't involved, the industry isn't going to change and risky borrowers will continue to get in trouble, mortgage investors will continue to profit and we won't be able to move on. Merely tightening the guidelines now will further degrade the real estate industry through harder qualifying, which has already begun. Are today's home buyers going to have to pay for the irresponsibility of the speculating buyers that are now in default? I believe they already are.
Bryant Tutas has two on-point articles about how the mortgage mess is bleeding into present day buyers. Also, how some lenders haven't changed their ways. Florida is another state that is in serious trouble with massive foreclosures.
Hard to get loans for today's real estate investors.
New home lender commiting loan fraud in front of the buyer's agent.
WHAT "SUBPRIME" LOAN BORROWERS WOULD GET RELIEF??? Or, are any home owners who have an adjusting loan included in the distressed group. There appears to be a tendancy for consumers and many real estate industry folks to classify any loan that is not a fully documented 30 year fixed mortgage as subprime. I don't believe that is accurate. Many 3, 5, 7 year loans are fully documented. If a fully documented loan borrower finds after 3 or 5 years that he can't make payments on the adjusted interest loan, that isn't a subprime problem as we know it. Are these borrowers going to get relief in California?? If California taxpayer's money is going to fund the cost of the relief, fine. If it is going to go national, then the federal government will have to step in and fund the relief for the entire country. That would give some relief to Florida and Nevada. But, many of the subprime problems in California, Florida and Nevada were speculators. The rapidly escalating real estate values of the years 2002-2005 spawned a new breed of speculator.
WHO IS A SPECULATOR? In past years, a speculator would be an investment buyer who acquired property to rent or resale after remodeling. They were not owner occupied buyers or borrowers. We now have an entirely new classification of speculators. They are:
- Borrowers who speculated that the price of new construction would continue to rise and they could sell at a profit when the new home was delivered. These homes were often financed with equity loans from the buyers residential property. Now they have two mortgage payments and faced with foreclosure.
- Borrowers who speculated that they could buy a new home and be able to sell their existing home prior to delivery. When there was no market for their existing home, they now own two homes and are faced with foreclosure because they can't make two mortgage payments.
IS CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE THAT DIFFERENT FROM MARYLAND?
During those years, I supervised about 15-20 agents. During those years, we settled about 450 home purchase contracts for Maryland buyers. I can remember only one (1) sub-prime loan closing. It is possible that some of our buyers closed sub-prime loans without my knowledge. However, I was in close communication with our home buyers in Maryland. If there were cases where our buyers were not qualifying for conventional loans and were sent to subprime borrowers, it must have gone very smoothly or I'd have heard about it.
The one subprime of which I'm aware was a buyer that I helped myself because she was referred to me by my attorney. The buyer contracted for a new home and was rejected by the builder's lender, but they agreed to outside financing. It was a difficult loan but finally closed with a 2/27 on which the buyer defaulted after 5 months which surprised me not one bit. The mortgage loan officer that did the loan worked like a dog to get it closed. It was the hardest loan I had ever seen and probably that great loan officers most difficult loan too. He took the loan only because he received 35-35 loans a year from buyers referred by Homefinders agents including myself. If all subprimes are as difficult as that one, I don't envy the loan officers who do them on a regular basis. When the loan officer said he "would get it closed", I knew he would because in 15 years, he had never failed to close a buyer I brought to him. I believe we both regretted that one.
My experience also says that, if 25% of the loans serviced by these companies are subprime, I suspect that there was a lot of mortgage steering involved by the loan originators or brokers who managed the financing for these borrowers. Someone please correct me if I'm wrong, but are 25% of California home buyers that risky??? What is the root cause of this number of subprime loans???
"There are a half million Californians who have subprime
loans that will jump to higher interest rates."
QUESTIONS?
What percentage of the borrowers with subprime loans is represented by the number of loan resetting? It would seem that ALL of the subprime loans would be resetting because, isn't that the nature of the loan?? Low rate for the first 2-3 years, then reset to a higher rate. If that's true, then fully 25% of California borrowers will have loans resetting and will be eligible for relief under the Governor's proposal. Love that guy.
How does this moratorium on resetting subprime loans affect the term of the loan?
How are the mortgage companies going to be compensated for the gigantic losses from freezing
subprime rates?
What's the estimated cost of this proposal?
If subprime borrowers are going to get relief, what about the subprime lenders that recommended these loans? I would suspect that if they wanted to, the regulators could easily determine who wrote subprime loans in numbers far in excess of industry norm.
WHO SHOULD BE PROACTIVE?
Assuming the program is authorized and funded, are the mortgage servicing companies going to be proactive and notice borrowers about the assistance?? Reports to date show that only about 1% of borrowers in default are contacting their mortgage company or servicers for help. That would seem to indicate that the mortgage companies need to search their records of eligible borrowers. It is fruitless to expect defaulting or near defaulting borrowers will initiate contact. It's just not the way things happen. The dynamics that drive borrowers in distress are fear, procrastination, resignation, avoidance, abandonment, embarrassment and simple acceptance of their condition of not being able to make their mortgage payment.
WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?
We read daily that mortgage companies are tightening their underwriting guidelines. Yet, we also know that the tightening of the guidelines is not the result of thoughtful quality control. Their more stringent underwriting guidelines are, in my opinion, the result of loss of liquidity because of loan defaults of the mortgage instruments defaulting that the lenders shouldn't have made in the first place. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are useless to offer any relief because the management of these giant former guarantors of liquidity have been managed by political hacks who acted with lies, trickery and deceit to cook the books to enhance their own bonuses. It is just possible that many of the loans that went to subprime investors could have been funded by normal means and sold to Fannie Mae had they not been busy covering up massive criminal accounting schemes.
THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME. Yet, daily we read about borrowers who are being steered to loans that are more expensive and risky for the borrower and more lucrative for the lender. I know from personal experience with home buyers I've worked with in the past 6 months that buyers get one result when they contact mortgage companies themselves and another result when I introduce them to a mortgage officer. It's not my pretty face that gets a good result for my buyers. It's simply that the loan folks know that they are being watched. I am contacted regularly by buyers whom I know have been the victims of mortgage fraud. That is a sad but true fact. I greatly admire good loan professionals. They are worth their weight in gold. Unfortunately, the likelihood of a home buyer hooking up with a good, experienced mortgage professional on their own is about as likely as hooking up with a good, experienced real estate buyers agent.
"So far have we come. So far have we yet to go" Winston Churchill
ADDENDUM: Bill Nazur took the time to answer some of the questions posed in my post above. This needs to be read by anyone interested in the subject of defaulting mortgage loans, foreclosures, subprime, forebearance and related subjects. Thanks Bill for taking the time. This is excellent.
COMMENT BY BILL NAZUR:
Ok, I'm back to hopefully address your questions.
I've been in finance and lending for 20 years as of a month ago, and this is by far the most far reaching painful period that we're experiencing. Even the late ‘80s with the aerospace industry consolidation, we did not see what we're seeing now. That is a different topic for now.
I have spoken to many interested parties, including but not limited to, the various forms of media that report on the happenings of our industry.
First and foremost, I've not seen any statistical data to support 25% of the business in California being subprime business, defined as those consumers with a credit score in the range of 500 to 619. The most accurate data I have shows anywhere from 9 to 14% of the total share being subprime. Now if we're looking at adjustable rate mortgages, the numbers are much higher ranging from 2002 until the first quarter of 2007, between 22 and 39%, but those include subprime, prime, and Alt-A (a fancy way of saying credit worthy but not able to document income enough to qualify). Yes, the issue is far larger than subprime, but few people want to associate with the ‘poor credit' folks. Keep burying your heads in the sand, people.
How does this moratorium on resetting subprime loans affect the term of the loan?
Unless the loan is being modified, which is not usually the case, the term remains the same, so when the loan does re-set, the payment shock will be even HIGHER! This will be a separate post in a day or so.
How are the mortgage companies going to be compensated for the gigantic losses from freezing subprime rates?
They are not, until the rates re-set. In order to pay off the loan over its specified term, they need to start collecting principal at some point, unless the consumer thinks that 30 years of pure interest is acceptable to them, without any payoff of principal.
What's the estimated cost of this proposal?
If compared to the Mortgage Debt and Forgiveness Relief Act of 2007 (don't get me started on that crappy legislation), the cost for that is around $1.4 trillion, and it covers a much smaller share than the amount of loans that are re-setting. I will have my co-author who has her Doctorate in Statistical Analysis extrapolate this out. I know we've looked at it before.
If subprime borrowers are going to get relief, what about the subprime lenders that recommended these loans?
While many of the originators are out of business, the companies that backed them are still very much alive, who are now dealing with the fallout of increasing the share of risky credit issuance. Ameriquest was one of the top companies, and were one of the first to go bankrupt. Their assets were serviced and seized by Citigroup, and we know that they have some of the greatest exposure in this mess. Much of New Century's portfolio was sold to other servicing companies such as Saxon, First Franklin, and Long Beach Mortgage; the latter being a wholly owned subsidiary of Wamu (which will be the next to implode in my humble opinion). Full Spectrum was the subprime arm for Countrywide, which is being hit, not only in the subprime, but every other sector, when it comes to loan performance. Then there is Merrill, Lehman, BearStearns, and all of the other Wall Street firms that are paying their dues for the extravagant growth that they experienced over the last few years.
I agree with Ed, in that you haven't seen anything yet. Sadly, many of us deal with these people on a daily basis. I just did an interview on FoxBusiness that really rattled me after hearing the story of a family in Stockton, California that lost their home after the re-set, rented another, and the owner of that one lost it to foreclosure as well. Sad, sad tale; their total investment: $1,000. Sounds like cheap rent to me. The end result is still sad, but you have to accept it for what it is; an opportunity, not a guarantee. We seem to have forgotten the difference when we see people point the finger at the banks or the lenders exclusively.
We reached this point as an industry, and need to figure out quickly how to resolve the issue. Politics are great for the exposure, but I for one, do not believe that government will be the impetus to change the behavior of the consumer. To that end, I agree with Eric's comment, and of course, Jeff is right about many of the threats that the consumer told the realtor or the lender, so my statement to that, is 'Did you play ball by breaking the rules, just because of the threat to go somewhere else?' I didn't, so this current bloodshed is thankfully not on my hands, but I certainly get to help clean up the mess. Bill Nazur.
==================================================================
Bryant Tutas just posted an on topic post. Check it out. It is specific to Florida.
Carol Cohen adds information about the market in Ohio. Check it out.
Cheryl Hale has some interesting info below. Check it out.
Ed Rybczynski contributes a thoughtful and fact filled analysis. Check it out.
==================================================================
Courtesy: Lenn Harley, Broker, Homefinders.com. 800-711-7988.