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There is an article on the BusinessWeek.com site that confirms something that I have been thinking for some time. The author, Preshant Gopal, points out that some of the areas where foreclosures are concentrated are not the areas where adjustable rate mortgages are concentrated. In areas where the value bubble has burst, borrowers are walking away from homes whether they have an ARM or not.

I believe, and this article somewhat confirms, that the major problem has been the lack of common sense in underwriting the loans. People without stable jobs, or who used tactics such as adding the income of another person who planned to move in with them to their income on a stated income loan, or who were speculators always on the edge of qualifying anyway just can’t ride out the turbulence when values drop even a little bit.

How can someone with a true debt ratio above 50% based on pretax gross income and who took out new consumer debt for furniture, big screen TV’s and a more expensive car after they closed on their home possibly deal with an unexpected financial problem?

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7 Comments on Its The Underwriting, Stupid

JAN
11
2008
Sad.  It is all about the all mighty $!
10:52am • #1
The underwriters don't make any money if they turn down a loan. Loan officers will send business else where if the deal can't get made. Make that deal and you get more work. It's a vicious circle. I think it was in part that there were so many loans being submitted that the underwriters didn't have enough time to look over everything as well as they could have. Now that the refi boom has all but stopped, underwriters are finding out they have way too much time on their hands. This is evident in the off the wall requests I've heard other appraisers, myself included, receive. I was once asked to remove the word Wednesday from the date I had on a report. I had always done my reports like that and it was fine for 4+ years. You can't put all the blame on underwriters though. There were many loans made in which the loan officer involved knew that the customer was in way over their head. But money makes the world go round and as long as that is the case things will always be the same.
11:08pm • #2
JAN
12
2008
1 Featured Post

I should make that more clear. I'm not talking about the underwriters but the underwriting rules themselves. The underwriters were just following them. FHA underwriters today get all the same pressures, and had all the same time constraints yet FHA default rates have actually gotten lower. The reason is that HUD holds the lenders accountable and will cut them off from the FHA program if their default levels are too high. So if a lot of business comes in the door, underwriting times just get longer. They don't relax the rules because they know they're selling the loan to someone else and won't have to worry about it. HUD will cut the lender off no matter who holds the loan when it defaults.

So on FHA loans you don't just approve a loan automatically as long as it has the right credit score and the right number of late payments in the last 12 months the way subprime loans have.  Or allow a debt ratio to go too high without some evidence that a person that a person can handle it or allow stated income loans as all. An underwriter on an FHA deal looks at the whole credit picture and analyzes the patterns. They don't just check off the boxes on a matrix and send it on down the line.

Challenging appraisals has more behind it than just too much time on the hands of underwriters. For the last several years as foreclosures have gone up, lenders are finding that values on the homes aren't anywhere near what they thought they were. There are a lot of different reasons for that that often have nothing to do with the quality of the original appraisal, but the result is that they had to set up some review systems and rules that make sure the quality of the appraisals is maintained. As usually happens when a process like this is made bureaucratic, people who don't really even understand the concepts behind and reasons why an appraisal is done the way it is. They just have a checklist and an AVM that determines what they do. Not to mention many lenders have now set up whole departments that every appraisal is sent to automatically. Human nature seems to be that if someone's job title includes the term "review" that they think they are supposed to find something wrong. ;)

5:01am • #3
MAY
17
2008

You are all partially right...and partially off the mark. Underwriting IS rules based...not income based. What changed in the early 2000 was a change in the rules, brought on by several influences. I believe the primary influence was the large increase in market share for Wall Street firms in secondary market securitizations. As late as about 1999, FannieMae and FreddieMac were responsible for about 80% of all mortgage securitizations...by 2004 their market share was around 45%, with Wall Street firms having grabbed the lion's share of what Fannie/Freddie lost. These firms introduced new, more liberal, underwriting rules based either on some flawed statistical analysis, wishful thinking, or "competitive forces" on an overly commoditized product.

At the same time, Fannie and Freddie were given aggressive affordable housing goals to meet in order to keep political pressure and oversight away from their doorsteps. As a result, underwriting standards were lowered to allow the homeownership levels to increase to appease Congress. This dual pronged threat from Congress and from loss of market share to Wall Street firms created an extremely competitive situation for Government Sponsored Enterprises that were usually immune from competition. In the highly commoditized world of A paper mortgages, about the only way to compete and differentiate is to lower your credit standards, lower your documentation requirements, or both. I believe that is exactly what happenned.

Most underwriters that were active during this time period of 2000 to 2008 can attest to the fact that they were given automated underwriting findings from Fannie and Freddie that approved loans that they would not have approved in an "old fashioned" manual underwrite. Also, they were given guidelines to new, untested mortgage products from Wall Street firms that drastically reduced the paperwork in a typical loan submission, and reduced the ability for an underwriter to perform adequate pre-funding quality control. Underwriters were faced with having their management dictate "waht made sense" by requiring that they approve loans with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae Automated approvals, or that met the minimum guidelines of the new Wall Street programs.

As a result, a flood of buyers saturated the real estate market and , in a great demonstration of the simple concept of supply and demand, drove prices on real estate to record levels.

Wall Street, with their untested mortgage products, created a scenario not totally unlike that of the "junk bonds" of the 80's...albeit this time with mortgage bonds and not commercial paper. As these loans began to fail, the value of these mortgage backed securities began to drop and the appetite for them shriveled up quickly. When the appetite for the bonds was gone, the pyramid of businesses balanced on this type of funding collapsed quickly. (See the mortgage "Implode-o-meter").

As foreclosures began to pervade the hottest real estate markets with extra supply, the values began a trend in the other direction. Appraisals performed in a stable or ever-increasing market get a lot less scrutiny than those performed in a market of decling values and over-supply. The secondary mortgage market has always been ill-prepared to deal with the "emergency" of declining values, so you have overly conservative analysis of appraisals, and what feels like unthinkable requests on appraisers, due to the lack of history and guidance on what to do in a declining market.

Jerry T
7:35am • #4
1 Featured Post

Jerry,

Thanks for your comment. :)

Your post is an excellent exposition on why the underwriting rules ended up so lax.

Yet I've read it through 3 times now and don't find anything which differs from my original point that lax underwriting rules and not subprime ARM adjustments were the cause of the foreclosures and resulting fall in property values. Yet even now we still hear on the news every day that the problem is a "subprime" mortgage mess caused by 2/28 ARMs adjusting.  The problem is much deeper than that.

People who are not speculators will fight tooth and nail to keep their home if they ever really had a legitimate chance of affording it in the first place. A large percentage of the foreclosures we've been having occurred before any rate adjustment at all because those people should have bought a less expensive home.

I was comparing all the problems we're having due to this lax underwriting with the FHA program which never got quite so free and thus is not having as bad a foreclosure problem in terms of percentage increase. Even FHA has had some underwriting issues, but never to the extent of using stated income or no doc programs or not ever requiring explanations for bad credit.

Thanks!

Carl Pruitt

9:07am • #5

Hmmmmm..... whenever this issue comes up, I turn my gaze in the direction of the secondary market.  Once the 100% LTV 80/20 to 580 fico borrowers with 50% DTI's showed up, I guess it was only a matter of time before we saw the 100% stated wage-earner for 620 fico borrowers took it's place.  I have always wondered:  if a wage-earner can't prove enough income to qualify for a loan at 50% LTV, why would anyone allow self-disclosure?  Let's assume 50% DTI's and 28% to taxes for someone making $60K/yr.  After debt service (before they go bonkers on the cards to furnish the new place) and taxes, that person has about $30 a day to live on.  It doesn't take a Wharton MBA or a fancy risk-modelling algorithm to figure out that that loan has a pretty high chance of blowing up.

3:02pm • #6
1 Featured Post

Juan,

You're right. It sure didn't take a genius to figure out that the thousands of loans done with underwriting guidelines like those had no chance to weather even the slightest market turbulence, much less the rapidly falling values in some areas today. Values, by the way, which never would have been that high without loose credit. 

And that loose credit would never have existed in the secondary market without both actual and implied guarantees from the government and from the Federal Reserve that they wouldn't let banks and large secondary market firms fail no matter what. Now they are in the catch-22 situation of having to guarantee deals like the Bear Stearns deal just to make sure the financial system doesn't collapse, when doing so actually makes the problem worse in the long term! Quite a mess. A big vicious circle.

On the other side, although the problem began with the underwriting rules, and better underwriting rules would have prevented the problem completely, I still don't care to hear the typical mortgage broker/loan officer excuse that they were just following the rules. Rules which we've already noted any idiot could see would send their customer into bankruptcy. Not a good long term business plan to bankrupt your customers.

But the best solution is at the source. Shut down the Federal Reserve from using loose credit to "manage" the economy. Nobel Prize winning economist F.A. Hayek showed them more than a half century ago that no one is smart enough or has enough information to do that.

3:36pm • #7

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Carl Pruitt - http://FHALoanAdvice.com

Buford, GA

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